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                         I Foreword 
   This is a very simple note which aims at to deal with, so to speak, "going 
concern" of scholars about how they are theorizing in studying various fields 
of legal problems, how they then reach to obtain their framework to be named 
"Legal Theory",') and how they in the end contribute to reconstruction f
"General Jurisprudence" or "Legal Philosophy" whether they explicitly reco-
   t This note is originally based on the report which I made at the monthly meeting (Dec. 
1975) ofKansai Horigaku-Kenkyukai (The Association of i terested scholars in general jurispru-
dence in Western area, Japan), and somewhat revised in this English version. 
      Professor of general jurisprudence of Faculty ofLaw, OsakaUniversity. L.L.D. Tokyo 
University 1968. 
    1) Scholars except specializing i  eneral jurisprudence or l gal philosophy in aconsider-
able degree like neither to call their work doing eneral jurisprudence or l gal philosophy, nor
to be called so by others, even if their work came quite similar to the framework f this ort in 
connection with some way of abstract formulation and generalization. This may be the same 
case with American scholars. They are rather tended tocall their work "Legal Theory". Though 
there are several easons, it may be a favored reason that "legal theory" sounds indeed a course 
of theorization in accordance with actually social needs and practice, but not a mere abstract 
formulation. This may be, I think, aproblem ofuser's taste or choice on that word. But such 
a tendency is relevant. Here, I shall search for a few issues by taking account ideas expressed 
in a form of legal theory developed. See M. Yasaki, Legal Philosophy 155-7, Chikumashobo, 
(1975).
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gnize it or not. As an illustration for this aim, I shall take ideas suggested and 
developed by some scholars at Harvard Law School where I did research for a 
while in the last year. 
   Admittedly this is merely a partial note, but not a fully considered paper, 
it has a decisive weakness in connection with its primary sources, because it 
mainly consists of a kind of materials I happened to gather orally through ques-
tions to and answers from scholars there, in other words, hearsay evidences, 
but not firmly recognized and reliable evidences as books, articles, etc. But 
such an impressionistic approach may have a merit to report immediately and 
introduce how their sharp interest awakened, deepened, and spreading out in 
regard to some common subjects. I shall make, from this point of view, a few 
remarks on my impression there. 
          II AmericanLegal Theory and New Generation 
   Recently I visited Harvard Law School for two months in the fall, 1975.2) 
The most impressive to me during this period of stay is a specific topic of New 
Generation suggested by M.J. Horwitz.3) He comes to the examination of 
this topic after having payed careful attention to the developing process appeared 
in American legal theory as the preceding problem. The process is shown by 
    2) I did research atHarvard Law School from Sept. to Nov. 1975. As general jurispru-
dence course or seminar incidentally are scheduled to open in the next spring session, apart from 
the short limit of my staying period, so I decided to learn within the short limit by asking and 
listening to some scholars there who seem to be interested in various topics of jurisprudence. 
It was Prof. J. Cohen who suggested me this way, and I am grateful to him for such a helpful 
advice. The text, as it shows, iswritten mainly on the basis of what I learned from Prof. M.J. 
Horwitz in his office, and of my comment. Then materials, too, come from hearing, but I made 
often simple notes in order to supplement the text and to show some scholaly interests in Japan. 
Though I am afraid if I would misinterpret Prof. Horwitz' idea and intention, I am very oblig-
ed to him for giving me this opportunity. In this short note I scarcely mentioned to Prof. L.D. 
Sargentich's idea. But I enjoyed with his stimulating discussion a d his well considered utili-
tatrian approach based on the modern analytical jurisprudence. Besides him, I now remember 
Professors with my gratitude who suggested and helped me in doing the plan: R.M. Unger, H.J. 
Steiner, H.J. Berman, A.M. Sacks, A. von Mehren, C. Fried, L.L. Fuller, J. Shklar (Govern-
ment), J. Rawls (Philosophy). 
    3) See (a)M.J. Horwitz, The transformation in the Conception of Property inAmerican Law, 
1780-1860, 40The Univ. of Chicago Law Rev. 248 (1973). (b) The Historical Foundation f 
Modern Contract Law, 87 Harvard Law Rev. 917 (1974). (c) On the Rise of Legal Formalism, 
4 American Journal of Legal History, Nov. 1975 (I don't read it yet). "Legal Theory and the 
Regulatory State" is a book he is planning to write.
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the following periodical order, that is, I Legal Formalism through 19th century, 
2 American Legal Realism since 1920-30, or Sociological Jurisprudence of 
Dean Pound, 3 Institutional Formalism since 1950, 4 New Generation from 
1965 to present. At first, I shall refer to these three stages necessary for further 
understanding of the crucial topic of the fourth stage, that is, New Generation. 
1 Legal Formalism 
   In the1820's and 1830's in the U.S., the codification movement gradually 
appeared with its argument that the judges do not have the legitimacy to make 
the law in a democratic society, the only form of legitimate law making is statute 
or code made by the legislature backed by popular opinion. This argument 
is evidently opposed to the Common law tradition. A response to this argument, 
in turn, can be seen in the treatises tradition in the early 19th century. Its first 
major expression is Chancellor, J. Kent's Commentaries, 1826, which have had 
a tremendous influences through the 19th century. The basic assumption about 
law and legal treatises i that law is a science. It has been repeated not only in 
the treatises, but adresses or auditoral occasions, etc., it has become the rethorical 
tradition of the law within the legal profession beginning in the 1820's and 1830's. 
But scholars at these days didn't talk about scientific method of law, until C.C. 
Langdell has treated law as a science in a sense of natural science. In this con-
text it is fairly clear that the treatises tradition stands in a dialectical relationship 
to the codification movement. That is, it attempts to demonstrate the major 
argument of the codification movement that the Common law system is political 
is wrong, and it also attempts o demonstrate that logic, reason, system of inter-
related legal concepts are not political. Legal Formalism will be traced in the 
idea as reflected in this tradition. It has taken over gradually the state court 
since around 1850, and at last it becomes the prevailing idea even in the Federal 
Supreme Court until the late 19th century. In the sense, then, Legal Formalism 
is the normal, ordinary, regularly usual posession of the legal profession i  the 
U.S. Legal Formalism in this way attempts o treat one of the central problems 
in the American law which is how can we justify in a democratic society the vast 
law making power that is given to the judge. This is a constant, recurrent issue. 
   The explanation above, so far, may well show a necessary conditionfor the 
rise of Legal Formalism, but not a sufficient conditon. Because, when we look
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at the legal opinion in the 1830's and 1840's, we don't see Legal Formalism there, 
even though we see it in the early period of treatises tradition and more and more 
formalistically minded legal scholars and legal elites. The decisive change can 
be observed in the 1850's. Let us cite an example from the contract law. 
   The 18th century doctrine of contract law was tended to pay anattention 
to results of contract, and to realization of objective values to be expected from 
this point of view. In the sense, whole series of doctrine allows the judge's or 
jury's intervention i to the bargaining system. The doctrine of this sort is, 
so to speak, based on a view of "substantive" exchange, mainly concerned with 
a distribution of wealth. In the course of the 19th century, however, it comes 
to be regarded as more and more inpermissible to do that. The question is 
raised as follows: As values realized by means of contract are only subjective 4) 
so it must be abstained from to concern substantly outcome of contract as well 
as to intervene in the bargaining system. The intervention is only justified in 
terms of process, form, neutral criteria, so and so. Under the market economy, 
such a concern with the outcome is regarded as an essence of political act. The 
approach in this way is formalistic, and contract law is formalized in terms of 
the approach as well as property law. Such is Legal Formalism b) Then, 
what is the remarkable in the latter half of the 19th century is that Legal 
Formalism appears as a kind of adequate l gal ideology for the demanded exten-
sion of the market economy. 
2 American Legal Realism 
   It is the well known Legal Realism from the 1920's to the 1940's which 
appears as one of the critic to Legal Formalism. Sociological Jurisprudence 
in this respect has also similar trends, but it is needless to say that both of them 
have quite a few differences in regard to their each own arguments. For the 
rise of Legal Realism, the following reason shall be refered. Legal Formalism 
indeed fairly corresponds to the autonomous economy and desire for its confor-
   4) See note (3) (b) 918 ff. 
    5) When Horwitz usesaword Legal Formalism, eaning of "formality" is not always 
clear, and it appears to need afurther clarification. M. Weber's classical analysis of the problem 
in terms of "formal-rationality" ma  be useful for this purpose, validity ofwhich in Anglo-Ameri-
can law, however, is doubted by Horwitz. In addition, see D. Kennedy, Legal Formality, II 
2 The Journal of Legal Studies, 351 (1973), and note (1) 201-3, 221-2.
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mity, predictability. According to the 19th century idea, law is regarded as 
distinct from policy, economy, and as a science. But enormous change raised 
by economic relations, class structure in the U.S. from the 19th century to the 
20th century, for instance, more and more prevailing trends in the economic 
concentration made the principle of freedom of contract and the underlying idea 
of Legal Formalism out of fashion. By contrast, private law suffers a greater 
change by means of a series of new legislations, for example, those for the gua-
rantee of the consumer, the poor, etc. Thus, the governmental regulation of 
the market economy becomes one of the great issues, and it reminds us of an 
image of the bureaucratic, regulatory state. It is Legal Realism, and other 
similar arguments which appear in this setting as typical egal ideology in those 
days. In the sense, Legal Realism can be called " Jurisprudence of the Bure-
aucratic, Regulatory State". It plays a theoretical role in corresponding to the 
intervention of the state into the distribution of wealth as really an internal 
problem of the social system. But what we must notice is that Realism is not 
social philosophy, or theory of social justice. Only facts are relevant to Realism, 
then it is tended to lead to worship of facts. Viewed in this light, Realism is 
forced to be conservative. Here again, Horwitz pays a special attention to the 
changing phase of American legal theory. The third is Institutional Formalism. 
3 Institutional Formalism 
   America in the 1950's politically shows very conservative cast of mind under 
the influence of the MacCarthyism, ideologically she is characterized bythe lack 
of idea of social conflicts. It is interesting to see the analytical philosopy as 
known by G. Ryle and others being prevailing under that circumstance, at the 
same time the notion of law as fundamentally right and as unrelated to politics. 
The Legal Process of H.M. Hart and A.M. Sacks is a symbolic work during 
this periods) It was printed as a tentative dition, 1958, and it has been still 
circulated in that mimeographed form untill now. Many similar works on the 
legal process has been published with constant reference to it. In the sense, 
the book is an unknown masterpice, it is given a position of a kind of bible in 
    (6) See review by Japanese Scholars: Hideo Tanaka and Hisashi Tanigawa, Legal Process, 
225, 227 Jurist, and H. Tanaka, Courts and Professions in England and in the United States 
(Eibei no Shiho), Todai-shuppankai, 1973.
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that field. The major topics are legal reasoning, construction, justification of 
law. It attempts to clarify fundamental differences between law and policy, 
though admitting their interaction to some extent. It stresses on institutions 
rather than theory, and procedures rather than values. For this reason it comes to 
be characterized as "Institutional Formalism". The result is its attitude tended 
to overlook social conflicts and to look at social identity, so coming to be uncri-
tical to such a delicate situation. Meanwhile, several devices uch as like "neut-
ral principles", "reasoned elaboration" are added and joined to the whole series 
of this sort. Again under the changing situation, scholars especially under 40 
ages who don't see law any more in the self-consistent unity, or body, beginn to 
show their disbelief in the traditional, established legal theories and to go out 
the way. In regard to the disbelief we may well call them "New Generation". 
4 New Generation 
   The expression itself is very attractive. But it is more stimulating for 
me as I have been a bit troubled about how to imply and allocate American 
legal theories after Legal Realism. The expression "New Generation" indeed 
impresses me strongly as well as Institutional Formalism, nay, more strongly 
than this. Then, what is New Generation? Now we come to the place to ans-
wer the original question. 
   First of all we must be careful in taking New Generation as a single unit. 
As Horwitz admits it, there are at least two wings of serious meaning of which 
we have to take account later. One has been strongly developed by G. Calab-
resi and R. Posner, another is going to be developed by Horwitz, J. Steiner, R.M. 
Unger and others.') Much stimulating issues come from the economic analysis 
    7) Economic utilitarianism refered by Horwitz find its typical examples in G. Calabresi, 
The Costs of Accidents, 1970, and R. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, 1972. In this Note 
their theories are refered inan extremely simplified form. It needs a more detailed supplemen-
tary explanation andI will do it in another chance. Some Japanese scholars have been interested 
in Calabresi's theory. See Koichiro Fujikura, Development of Liability of Torts (Fuhokoi Sekinin 
no Tenkai), 107 Doshishahogaku 1, and Akio Morishima, Calabresi's Theory on Liability Rule 
for compensation (Songaibaisho Sekinin Rule ni Kansuru Calabresi Riron), in: New Trends in 
Private Law Theory (Shihogaku no Aratana Tenkai), Collected Papers inMemory ofLate Prof. 
Wagatsuma, Yukikaku, 1975. 
  Within another wing of New Generation, see below note (16) as to Unger. G.P. Fletcher, 
Fairness and Utility in Tort heory, 85 Harvard Law Rev. 537 (1972) may serve as an interesting 
sketch of the problem.
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of legal problems, and reach to a level of ethical theory of law, that is, a favorite 
topic of general jurisprudence. Let us take briefly a very simple example from 
the bargaining process of private individuals in the marketing system. Accord-
ing to the classical utilitarianism, people are "rational maximizers ofsatisfaction" 
and minimizers of cost. Under the present, highly complicated situation, how-
ever, they may suffer very different kind of, and often unexpected damages or 
costs as typically exemplified by automobile accident. 
   "The function of legal remedies, viewed in an economic perspective, is to 
impose cost on people who violate legal rules "8) and to deter them from such 
acts. But in many cases it is not enough to impose costs directly injurers on one 
to one basis for several reasons. That is why now it comes to be insisted that 
not only those, but a wider range of people who are likely to be injurers, or 
others hould pay costs. For this purpose, not only private insurance, but so-
cial insurance, nterprise liability, and so on, are crefully taken into consideration, 
to say nothing of methodological problems uch as policy, goal, etc. Indeed, 
it is a delicate problem whether we want costs deterence orloss spreading in con-
nection with distribution. It may be interesting to see that according to Hor-
witz, Calabresi hows a positive attitude to admit some intervention of the state 
into market whereas Posner is negative in this connection, and he only admits 
the state's intervention within a limit of maximization ofsole national products. 
Though differing in their each own contentions, Horwitz continues to point 
out, both stand for the same utilitarian point of view, and both lack of further 
insight of problem of distribution. Especially this is true for Posner. He 
appears to conceive law as a means of policy, his idea in the sense ideological. 
Consequently, it results to conceal a very nature of bargaining power being 
unequal in reality. 
   Thus Horwitz criticizes them though admitting himself as another wing of 
New Generation. He certainly recognizes a very meaning of the marketing 
system. But he very carefully looks at increasingly changing power-relationship 
between bargaining parties, and points out the dangerous direction that the 
relationship s now regulated by the regulatory state. In addition, as he thinks 
it impossible to reintegrate economy merely by means of minimization of the 
state's intervention i to it as Posner thought, still Horwitz emphasizes a direc-
    8) See note (7) Posner, 357.
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tion of economic reintegration and thereby a fair distribution by means of pater-
nalistic9) regulation through the state. He thinks there is no more way than this. 
Then, how does he think of fair distribution problem? Does he have any con-
crete idea for its realization? Without depending on the utilitarian point of view, 
on what basis can he develop his argument? Here, he refers to J. Rawls' Theory 
of Justice.10) 
    Rawls' theory itself is not really a new one. It is, so to speak, an attempt o 
make together many different ypes of theories into one framework which mainly 
consists of two elements, that is, natural right theory and egalitarianism. The 
utilitarianism, viewed in a whole context of American culture, becomes increa-
singly unsatisfactory, perhaps generally for the reason that it doesn't offer any 
theoretically proper consideration for sacrificed people under the principle of 
maximization of interests. It is clear that if we look at American culture and 
whole series of American ideals, natural right theory and individualistic tendency 
for two hundred years are very strong and have to come to surface. Rawls, 
recognizing this tendency, attempts to accomodate utilitarian premises of any 
large scale of industrial order with some conceptions of natural right. His theory 
thus includes two tiers system. Tier No. 1 is basically absolute natural right 
conception mostly revolving procedural guarantees. Tier No. 2 is utilitarian 
principles limited by natural rights. R. Nozick's ideal") may serve here as a 
contrast. That is a right wing attack on Rawls'. He argues most forms of 
interventions are illegimate, and he argues against Rawls' attempt to some 
egalitarian distribution. - It is worth noticing that Nozick's general way of 
thinking in this context is to a considerable xtent similar to Posner's - . But 
both, Rawls and Nozick have begann to attack the bureaucratic state. This 
convergence must not be overlooked. 
   Rawls' theory of justice sounds the most attractive and clearly has had the 
influence on scholars, including those at Harvard Law School. The latter is 
another wing of New Generation, and their legal theory developed under that 
    9) "Paternalism" has a wider range of meaning. For its proper use, it needs to bemore 
precisely explained. 
   10) Precise review of Rawis' A Theory of Justice (1971) has been made by Japanese cho-
lar. See Shigeaki Tanaka, Theory of "Justice as Fairness", The Annual of Legal Philosophy, 1
61 (1972), Justice, Liberty, and Equality, The Annual of Legal Philosophy, 69 (1974). More-
over, note above (3) (b) 260f. will show an aspect of Horwitz' criticism to utilitarianism. 
   11) R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 1974.
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influence is " Jurisprudence of the Bureaucratic, Regulatory State". The term 
repeated here is originally used for designating Legal Realism. Two theories 
in this respect appears common and same. But, while Realism was a theory 
of justification for the bureaucratic state, legal theory of the New Generation is
a theory critical to that state. 
                     III SomeComments 
   Horwitz repeatedly calls attentiontothe problem: how to justify the demo-
cratic society which permits judge's law making power really a central issue, 
to which American legal theory have had again and again to return. In taking 
account of such a recurrent issue, he traces the jigsaw styled changing process 
of the legal theory, as if an expert of calligraphy at one effort writes a long sen-
tence with a beautiful contrast of black and white. Thus he points out so 
impressively that we are tended to accept his idea hitting the mark, his way of 
explanation good reasoned and persuasive. Now I shall again examine the first 
impression said above. It may be our common experience tobe bound ourselves 
too much by so strong impression to overlook another side of coin. How about 
this case? There are a few points to be noticed, except further problems to 
be omitted here. 
1 As to the basis of his argument 
   The main course of his argument clearly has been connected with his criti-
que on the utilitarian approach made by Posner and Calabresi. While their 
works have been made public through books or articles, Horwitz' argument has 
only been suggested in his articles concerning rather historical study of property, 
contract, and so on. As I wrote it in the footnote above, I am afraid if my note 
on his unpublished idea on the way of formation might be different from his 
original intention. But I really hope to have his argument published in the 
near future to make more easy to understand the underlying problems. 
2 As to the concept of law 
   According to Horwitz, New Generation doesn't believe in the traditional
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legal theory. Let us assume the traditional as including the three types mention-
ed above. The legal theory of New Generation is different from them. But 
it is not unrelated with them in a sense that both of them have been brought 
up on the common background, the U.S. This may be especially case with a 
wing of the utilitarian approach, because it is criticized by Horwitz for its nega-
tive attitude to introduce morals into law. That wing's concept of law, so far 
as this aspect is concerned, is very similar to the legal positivist's. Then, how 
about an idea of Horwitz himself in criticizing that opponent wing? Is it his 
real intention to remove such a distinction? It isn't true, however it looked like 
so at first glance. He admits as a matter of fact certain formality of the law 
in a considerable degree and its possibility in formally functioning sometimes 
to check and limit the originally interested dominant people (in making that 
law) against their interest, and so on. It may well be said from this that so 
far as law functining process i concerned, hedoesn't conceive law as a mere 
amulgam of different social phenomena, but he still maintains, soto speak, "an 
idea of law as a functioning unit". Even though this doesn't make his idea very 
close to positivist's position, there remains much interesting task of how to 
examine and allocate it within a context of various legal theories. 
3 As to the bureaucratic or regulattory state 
   What is an impressive figure underlying the conteporary legal theory is 
the bureaucratic or regulatory state. It may be presumable for another wing 
of the New Generation including Horwitz to take the state as a target of their 
criticism. It appears plausible when we remember his remarks on the trans-
formative process of legal theories from Legal Formalism through Realism, 
Institutional Formalism to New Generation, and the appearance of the latter 
with its critical characteristic to that state. Indeed, such a presumption may 
come true when he treats his approach on the changing succession f these legal 
theories as a "pessimistic" note. But he is, here too, very careful in the criti-
cism. Clearly finding out some dangerous directions immanent in the modern 
bureaucratized regulatory state, he still seems to think it possible to reintegrate 
the economic system in terms of the paternalism within a framework of the state 
of this sort. His approach may well be said pessimistic, but it looks not always 
so to the end.
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4 As to a validity of the classification 
   The existence of what is called Legal Formalism at the first stage, then 
Realism at the second are well known for scholars through some similar expre-
ssions though a bit different in their each connotation. Therefore, these terms are 
generally acceptable. Legal Formalism rather may well be analyzed in regard 
to its further developed consideration. By contrast, the following third and 
fouth stages of Institutional Formalism and New Generation may raise a series 
of objections or implications. 
   At first, We may have objections in a following way: If New Generation 
is recognized in this way as the contemporary legal theory, how can we treat 
other trends in that context? In order to understand the objection, it is good 
enough to mention to their names uch as like studies in law and society, socio-
logy of law, or legal theories based on the achievements of cultural anthrolopology 
or behavioral science, etc. We may also have another type of objection in defe-
nse of the study of legal process. It has been certainly criticized as Institutional 
Formalism. But, is it meererly concentrated in the analysis of institutions and 
procedure? Apart from such an analysis as its central task, it pays necessary 
attention to the problem of legal values in legal theory as well as the relevant 
problem of law and society. Otherwise, the study of legal process itself would 
become less meaningful and powerful ....... Thus objections will be raised one 
after another. These objections are not prejudiced, but natural to be expected 
generally, therefore by Horwitz, too. It is the next topic to concern with how 
to imply his analysis of legal theory, especially after Realism. 
   It is very presumable that he doesn't assert both of Institutional Formalism 
at the third stage and New Generation at the fourth stage respectively asthe sole 
legal theory since 1950. It is only asserted that as far as the problem of theory 
and practice about law and marketing system is concerned, both, Institutional 
Formalism latent in the study of legal process and New Generation have each 
respectively different trends in each different senses through this period. Isn't 
this one way of implication? 
   Of course,there may be much stronger objections unsatisfied with such 
a trivial implication: there is no necessity or reason to refer Institutional For-
malism and New Generation as representing the third and fourth stages. Is
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the expression, New Generation itself free from vagueness? Isn't it decisively 
clear weakness for the New Generation, being separated into two wings, to lack 
its identity as a single legal theory? The study of law and society or legal process 
rather are full of richness in their content, and yet useful in terms of outline of 
the formative aspects in American legal theory ....... But it is needless to cite 
furthermore hypothetical objections one after another. I shall understand here 
his treatment of Institutional Formalism and New Generation as one of each 
relevant trends in American legal theory and as giving each of them the periodical 
classification of the third and fourth. 
5 As to the marketing system and utilitarianism 
   Horwitz' critique of the theory of Posner and Calabresi is mainly reduced 
to the argument that they are too much concerned with maximization of sole 
national products from the utilitarian point of view in regard to the marketing 
system, to disregard people sacrificed by this attempt. Indeed, the utilitarian 
idea, as symbolized by the principle, "greatest happiness of the greatest num-
ber" since J. Bentham has always had to face severe criticism for its disregard 
to the people who are eliminated from that greatest number. It is clear that 
Horwitz develops his idea in accordance of this line of criticism. On the other 
hand, utilitarianism too, in response to such a citicism, has undergone a conside-
rable change, but not still remains in the original form since 19th century. 
Moreover, it is inconceivable for Horwitz to argue utilitarian consideration e -
tirely useless to the problem of marketing system. He thinks it possible that 
theory of justice sometimes and within a certain limit refers to utilitarian con-
siderations and vice versa. It must be a fascinating problem how to confine 
and confirm a certain limit. This may be the case with Rawls' theory of justice 
as well as L.D. Sargentich's utilitarian theory of law. According to Sargentich, 
utilitarianism atpresent is ready to take and taking suggestions presented by the 
theory of justice into consideration. It will be much more interesting and 
necessary to examine such an attempt if we remember his basic course of legal 
thinking to rest on the so-called modern analytical jurisprudence nergetically 
developed by H.L.A. Hart in England. Seen in this light, it is understandable 
that the discussion made by Horwitz has a stronger sense far beyond mere out-
line of American legal theory. The issue here is picked up without any hesita-
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Lion through is insight of the remarkable trends which come apparent in paying 
attention to a number of different, sometimes conflicting streams of legal theories 
from the 19th to the 20th century America, and allocated as a series of specific 
models of legal theory along the vertical line, so to speak, of the timebase of his 
investigation. In using them as models, we may, by referring to and by means 
of investigation f concrete fields of law, for instance torts, come to reach a pos-
sible total examination of highly complexed iscussions of general nature 
concerning theory of justice, utilitarianism, and modern analytical jurisprudence, 
or a meaning of the bureaucratic, regulatory state to the legal theory at present.12) 
This is clearly one of the most interesting task suggested by Horwitz, though 
it is perhaps inadequate for us to treat and judge the task in an impetuous way. 
      IV Significance and Limits of the Western Legal Tradition 
   "Legal Theory" has a very wide range of extension. Scholars at Harvard 
Law School, too, are engaged in their work on legal theory from quite differnt 
aspects. If I tentatively call the theory summarized above the vertical investiga-
tion of law in a sense that it is made along the historical timebase, I shall now 
make a quick outline on what may well be called horizontal investigation. I 
shall take it here as attempts to investigate law and legal theory in the modern 
period within a horizontally or spacially huge dimension, not limited to the 
West, still less to one country. One of the interesting works, though not popu-
lar, is H. J. Berman's The Western Legal Tradition.13) He beginns to deal 
with the subject by some genetic examination f the tradition, that is, to point 
out a notion of "a body of law"14) appearing under the so-called Glossing School 
of Gratianus and Irnerius at Bologna, and reachs to investigation of how the 
modern Western legal tradition was increasingly established and developed 
through theory and practice of law in England and the Continental europe, then 
mentions to American legal education, too. This mimeographed material may 
   12) In this connection, seeR. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harvard Law Rev. 1057(1975). 
Moreover, K. Greenawalt and E. Nagel, Seminar in Legal Philosophy, Materials, privately 
printed for the exclusive use of students in the School of Law at Columbia Univ., Autumn, 
1975 will serve as a material for understanding of such acurrent trend mentioned in the text. 
   13) H.J. Bermann, The Western Legal Tradition: its relation tothe great revolution f 
Western history and to the world revolution f the 20th century, material, 1972. 
   14) See note (13) 74.
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serve as one of the keys for understanding the Western legal tradition in a limited 
sense. 
   But further attention is to be paid on such attempts which are not mere 
byproducts of the study of the Western law, but which directly study the Eastern 
law and legal theory, and make a comparative study of both. J. Cohen is one 
of the promoters in this direction.") Through his energetic work in theory 
and practice, he emphasizes how relevant the Eastern law and legal theory are 
to the legal studies, and he appears to warn, like the principle, "stop, look, and 
listen", that legal scholars have been too much concentrated on the Western law. 
Viewed in this context, R.M. Unger's attempt may well be said as a kind of reply 
to this warning, because he is intended to reexamine aframework of the Western 
law and liberal legal theory, to introduce somewhat plularistic investigation of 
law in connection with Chinese law, Japanese law, Islamic law, and so on.'s1 
   It is needless to say on the one hand, that the Western modern law has 
played a decisively important role as a standard for our conceptual analysis of 
law. On the other hand, the Western law has been tended to be identified as 
"modern law in general"
, moreover "law in general" as bearing universalistic 
values. 
   This is undoubtedly a kind of overstatement we often make, and yet it 
is much more true if we remember the simple fact that all modern societies 
are not the Western societies, and outside the Western world, and indeed there, 
modernizations adequate for each own different social situations have become 
an urgent necessity. That is a kind of trap most scholars of the Western law 
easily fall into. There were a few scholars reflecting the matter with keen insight, 
but recently such a reflection increasingly comes to be shared by scholars with 
disillusioned eyes as exemplified in Unger's view.- What I should like to 
mention at last is that both, the horizontal as well as the vertical investigation 
have been actively advanced foreward, not only within a certain limit of legal 
scholars at Harvard, but in a form of mutual exchange of scholarly opinions 
within a wider scale in the U.S., furthermore through the world. 
   15) J. Cohen, The Criminal Process of Law in the People's Republic of China 1949 -
1963, 1968. 
   16) R.M. Unger, The Place of Law in "Modern" Society, 1971, on file in Harvard Law 
Library. Law in Modern Society, Toward a Criticism of Social Theory, 1976. Knowledge 
and Politics, 1975. 
   17) See D.M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law, 82 The Yale Law Journal 1 (1972), 
moreover, note (1) 222 ff.
